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ABSTRACT
In response to the call for increased U.S. border security, the
Department of State has designed a new electronic passport - the
"e-passport. " The government began issuing e-passports to the
general public on August 14, 2006. The new passport stores a
digital photograph and personal information in an electronic chip
contained within the passport. At the inspection site, a machine
reader verifies the information's authenticity by capturing a radio
frequency emitted by the electronic chip. However, privacy
advocates have raised concerns regarding the need for more
protection of such biometric information due to the dangers of: (1)
the unauthorized capture of information; (2) clandestine tracking;
(3) 'function creep;" (4) information concentration; (5) the
association of biometrics with criminality; and (6) automation.
Therefore, the Department of State has revised its e-passport
design to include protective features in addition to digital
signatures and active authentication, most notably a cover made of
anti-skimming material, and Basic Access Control.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a long, international flight ending with your arrival into the
United States, you get off the plane and follow your fellow passengers
to the passport inspection area. When your turn arrives, you approach
the counter and hand your newly issued passport to the passport
control officer. This passport is similar to your old one, but slightly
thicker. The officer opens the passport to the data page, which
includes a digital photograph, personal information, and two lines of
printed characters on the bottom of the page, and swipes the page
through a reader next to him. He then activates a camera, which takes
a digital photo of your face. A few seconds after waving the passport
inches away from another reader, the officer glances at you to compare
your face with the images on his screen and in your passport. A short
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time later, he hands the passport back to you, and you head to customs.
This experience may seem vaguely similar to every other airport
passport inspection you have experienced, but this time a very
different sequence of events has occurred. In those brief minutes, the
officer has: (1) accessed an electronic chip located within your
passport; (2) retrieved a digital photograph of you and your personal
information; and (3) verified that your passport was legitimately
issued, the information contained within the chip has not been altered,
your face and information match the information located on the
passport data page and in the chip, and that your name has not been
flagged as a wanted criminal or terrorist. Your newly issued passport
is an "electronic passport" or simply "e-passport."' l
This paper chronicles the growing use of biometrics in ensuring
U.S. security and the evolution of the United States e-passport over the
course of 2005, including its proposed approach, the privacy concerns
raised in response to that proposal, and the Department of State's
revised approach. However, the Department of State's revision
remains susceptible to several privacy concerns and global
interoperability problems must be resolved to ensure effective
international implementation of e-passports.
II. ORIGINS OF THE U.S. E-PASSPORT
The U.S. government defines a "passport" as "any travel document
issued by a competent authority showing the bearer's origin, identity,
and nationality if any, which is valid for the admission of the bearer
into a foreign country.",2 Subject to certain exceptions,3 a U.S. citizen
may not depart from or enter the United States unless he or she has a
valid U.S. passport.4 The Secretary of State has the authority to grant
and issue passports and to allocate the authority to grant, issue, and
verify passports. 5  In an effort to upgrade border security, the
1 Roger Yu, Electronic Passports Set to Thwart Forgers, USATODAY.COM, Aug. 9, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2005-08-08-electronic-passportsx.htm.
2 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(30) (2005).
3 See 22 C.F.R. § 53.2 (2005).
4 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (2005).
' 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (2005).
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Department of State has begun incorporating facial recognition
technology in the next generation of passports. 6 This is done using a
biometric identifier contained within electronic chips implanted in the
passports. 7  These "e-passports" include enhanced security features,
that improve the ability of officials to verify identities and prevent
misuse of passports by others.8
A. THE US-VISIT PROGRAM
Plans for these enhanced passports have coincided with the
development and implementation of the United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program ("US-VISIT"), which
also seeks to improve border security by incorporating biometric
technology. 9 The US-VISIT program authorized the Department of
Homeland Security to require non-immigrants, who are seeking to
enter or leave the United States, to provide biometric identifiers at all
land, sea, and air ports of entry." Required biometric identifiers
include fingerprints and digital photographs."1 Statutory authority for
this program is found in the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, the Visa Waiver
Permanent Program Act of 2000, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and
the Border Security Act of 2002.12 These statutes mandate the
implementation of an automated entry-exit system that keeps a record
of the arrival and departure of non-immigrants, verifies their identities,
6 Electronic Passport, 70 Fed. Reg. 8,305, 8,305-06 (proposed Feb. 18, 2005) (to be codified at
22 C.F.R. pt. 51), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/05-3080.htm [hereinafter
Proposed Rule].
7id.
' Id. at 8,305-06.
9 United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, 69 Fed. Reg.
53,318 (Aug. 31, 2004 ) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 215,235,252), GPO Access, available
at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/06jun2O04l 800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/
pdf/04-19906.pdf [hereinafter US-VISIT].
'
0Id. at 53,318.
1 Id.
121d. at 53,318-19.
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and authenticates their travel documents using the biometric
identifiers. 13 The arrival and departure data is entered into databases
integrated with relevant law enforcement and intelligence systems,
which are used to determine whether particular non-immigrants should
be admitted. 14 Since its inception, Jim Williams, Director of the US-
VISIT Program, has reported that the 104 northern and southern U.S.
border land ports of entry with biometric capabilities have processed
more than 47 million visitors, allowing the Department of Homeland
Security to intercept more than 1,000 flagged travelers. 15
B. THE U.S. VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
Travelers from countries participating in the U.S. Visa Waiver
Program are required to enroll in US-VISIT identity verification and
admissibility procedures. 16 The Visa Waiver Program allows travelers
from twenty-seven countries to visit the United States for up to ninety
days without a visa. 17  However, applicable countries must comply
with certain requirements, including the issuance of machine-readable,
tamper-resistant passports that comport with International Civil
Aviation Organization ("ICAO") standards. Congress has extended
the deadline for all visa waiver countries to issue e-passports that
incorporate biometric identifiers to October 26, 2006, as many
applicable countries have been unable to meet the previous October
13 1d. at 53,319.
14 id
15 Interview by Lou Dobbs with Jim Williams, Dir. of the US-VISIT Program, Dep't of
Homeland Sec., and Randy Hyatt, Dir. of Technology, Information and Architecture Systems
at the Gov't Accountability Office (Jan. 27, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 1693246
[hereinafter Interview with Williams & Hyatt].
16 US-VISIT, supra note 9, at 53,322.
17 U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html#2 (twenty-seven countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program are: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino,
Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
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2005 deadline. 18 Passports issued before October 26, 2005, must be
machine-readable; those issued between October 26, 2005, and
October 25, 2006, must either include a digitized photograph on the
data page or feature an integrated chip containing information from the
data page.19 The digital photograph must be printed onto the passport
data page rather than attaching it with glue or lamination techniques.
2 0
However, those who hold passports issued before October 26, 2005,
will not have to apply for a new, enhanced passport as long as the
passport has a machine-readable zone.
2 1
Any visa waiver nation that does not incorporate biometric
identifiers according to ICAO standards by October 26, 2006, risks
denial of its citizens' entry into the United States. In addition,
transportation carriers will be fined (up to $3,300) for each visa waiver
traveler without an appropriate passport. Additionally, the
Department of Homeland Security has reported that twenty-five of the
twenty-seven visa waiver countries have fully complied with the
October 26, 2005, deadline requirements, with the majority
incorporating digital photographs into their passports.23 Thus far, only
Italy and France24 have been unable to meet the requirements, and
18 U.S. Extends Visa Scheme Deadline, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/4095244.stm.
19 Id.
20 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Visa Waiver Program: Passport Requirements Timeline,
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/content-multiimage/content-multiimage_0021 .xml
(last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
21 id.
22 Press Release, U.S Custody and Border Patrol, Majority of VWP Countries to Meet Digital
Photo Deadline (Oct. 26, 2005),
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news-releases/archives/2005_press-releases/i 02005/
10262005.xml.
23 Id.
24 Doreen Carvajal, Another Blow to U.S.-French Ties: A Visa Bottleneck, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
2, 2006, at A 13, available at http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/intemational/europe/
02visa.html (dispute between the Ministry of the Interior and public labor unions over who
will manufacture the new passports has forced French tourists wishing to visit the U.S. to
obtain visas; however, fees and processing delays have created a huge disincentive for U.S.
travel).
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therefore, visitors from those countries have been advised to apply for
a visa before attempting travel to the United States
25
III. THE PROPOSED U.S. APPROACH
On February 18, 2005, the U.S. Department of State published a
proposed rule for the design and implementation of the U.S. e-
passport.26  The Department of State has chosen to enhance the
traditional U.S. passport by placing an electronic chip within the
passport that contains information included on the passport's data
page. In addition, the chip will include a digital version of the bearer's
photograph, a unique chip number, and security measures to prevent
unauthorized alteration or removal of data contained in the chip.27 In
order to ensure the global interoperability of its e-passports, the
Department of State has elected to follow guidelines established by the
ICAO regarding "machine-readable travel documents." 2
8
A. ICAO STANDARDS FOR MRTD'S
The ICAO, composed of 189 member states and affiliated with the
United Nations, creates standards and recommended practices
("SARPs") for the aviation industry. 29  These standards are
internationally accepted among the member states and are under
constant review to ensure global interoperability in aviation and
safety.
30
25 Majority of VWP Countries to Meet Digital Photo Deadline, supra note 22.
26 Proposed Rule, supra note 6.
21 Id. at 8,306.
2 1 Id. at 8,305.
29 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. (ICAO), Making an ICAO Standard,
http://www.icao.int/cgi/gotom.pl?/icao/en/anb/mais/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
30 id.
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The ICAO mandates that "machine-readable travel documents"
conform to the standards described in ICAO Document 9303. 3 1 These
standards tackle issues such as the size of the passport and photograph,
what biographical information must appear on the passport's data
page, and how that data is organized.' The specifications for the
passport data page require visual (eye-readable) data, as well as a
separate data summary that is machine-readable. The required data
includes: the document type, issuing state or organization, name of
holder, document number, nationality, date of birth, sex, and date of
expiration or valid-until date.34 The machine-readable information is
located in the Machine-Readable Zone ("MRZ"), represented by two
lines of printed text at the bottom of the data page, each with forty-
four characters.35 An appropriate reader optically scans the two lines
containing the information that is located in the Machine-Readable
Zone.36 Additional use of capacity expansion technology (such as
contact or contactless electronic chips, or optical cards) to increase
information storage space is optional, but if used, the information
repiires a standardized Logical Data Structure ("LDS") to program
it. The standard structure ensures global interoperability for
machine-reading of that data.38 If such optional capacity expansion is
utilized, then the only data that ICAO requires the chip to hold is that
which is contained in the Machine-Readable Zone of the data page.
39
31 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. (ICAO), Machine Readable Travel Documents - Biometrics:
Introduction, http://www.icao.int/mrtd/biometrics/intro.cfin (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
32 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), TECHNICAL REPORT: DEVELOPMENT OF A LOGICAL
DATA STRUcTURE- (LDS) FOR OPTIONAL CAPACITY EXPANSION TECHNOLOGIES, REVISION 1.7,
10-16 (May 18, 2004), available at http://www.icao.int/mrtd/download/documents/LDS-
technical%20report%202004.pdf [hereinafter LDS TECHNICAL REPORT].
33 d. at 10.
34 Id. at 11, 16.
BId. at 10-11.
36Id. at 11.
3Id. at 12.
38Id. at 13.
391d. at 15.
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The U.S. Department of State's proposal calls for the use of such
capacity expansion technology. E-passports use contactless,
integrated electronic chips embedded within the documents. 40 Aside
from the information contained on the data page, the electronic chip
will include a digitized version of the bearer's photo.41 This digital
photo will serve as a biometric identifier, which allows for the
incorporation of facial recognition technology at passport inspection
sites to verify personal identity.
42
B. INCORPORATION OF BIOMETRICS
"Biometrics" refer to the automated methods of recognizin3g a
living person through the use of physiological or behavioral traits.4 In
this context, a biometric sample is compared to a biometric
"template," which refers to a version of a trait encoded by a computer
algorithm such that comparisons of separately recorded traits of an
individual sufficiently identify that individual.44  Common
physiological traits used for identification and verification include
facial recognition, fingerprints, and iris recognition. 45 "Identification"
refers to a one-to-many search in which biometric data is compared
against a compilation of biometric templates made up of all subjects
enrolled in the system; "verification" refers to a one-to-one match
between biometric data taken from a passport bearer and the biometric
template created when that bearer enrolled in the system.46 According
to ICAO standards, the use of biometrics is optional - at the
40 U.S. Dep't of State, The U.S. Electronic Passport,
http://travel.state.gov/passport/eppt/eppt 2498.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS: TECHNICAL REPORT, VERSION 2.0, 8 (May 21, 2004), available at
http://www.icao.int/mrtd/download/documents/Biometrics%2 0deployment%2of/2OMachin
e%20Readable%2OTravel%2ODocuments%202004.pdf.
4id.
45 Id.
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preference of the issuing State or organization.47 However, if the
issuing authority chooses to incorporate biometrics into its e-passports,
ICAO standards mandate the use of a contactless integrated circuit to
hold the biometric information.48 The ICAO has adopted facial
recognition as the primary, globally interoperable biometric identifier
for machine-assisted identity confirmation, and therefore, an encoded
digital photograph must be included in the enclosed contactless
electronic chip if biometrics are incorporated into the passport.
49
Furthermore, fingerprint and iris information are optional if the issuing
authority desires to incorporate additional identity confirmation
techniques.5 0
C. CONTACTLESS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS USING RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION
According to ICAO guidelines, the electronic chips used in
machine-readable travel documents must follow the ISO/IEC 14443
standards.5 1  Reasons for following this particular standard are
multifold, including: (1) global interoperability; 52 (2) application of
contactless integrated circuits ("ICs") to both staffed and automated
border inspection methods;53 (3) the increasing availability of radio
frequency ("RF") reader machines that can read contactless ICs; (4)
the durability of contactless ICs; (5) the inclusion of anti-collision
procedures, which prevent multiple readings if multiple passports are
47 LDS TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 22.
48 Id. at 13.
491Id. at22.
50 Id
51 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), USE OF CONTACTLESS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS IN
MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS: VERSION 4.0,6 (May 5, 2004), available at
http://www.icao.int/mrtd/downtoad/documents/Annex%20 %20%2OContactess%20ICs.pdf
[hereinafter USE OF CONTACTLESS ICs].
52 Id. at 7 (the radio frequency band required by ISO/IEC 14443 is available worldwide).
53 Id. (staffed border inspections required the passport bearer to surrender his or her passport
to a border official, whereas in automated inspections the bearer approaches an automated
gate with the passport and is either permitted or denied entry or exit).
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in the active range of the RF reader; (6) the availability of data storage
to encode the data structure and biometric data; and (7) ease of
incorporation into machine-readable travel documents.5 4
Silicon chips represent the optimal solution for machine-readable
travel document data storage, as opposed to alternatives such as bar
codes and optical cards that respectively suffer from low storage
capacity and impracticality.55 Silicon chips are widely used today in
bank cards and other "smart cards," which are contact integrated
circuit cards (requiring physical contact to transmit data).5 6 However,
these are impractical for e-passport purposes due to the need for
physical swiping, and potential interference from dirt or moisture.57
Contactless cards that use silicon chips, on the other hand, utilize radio
frequencies ("RF") that can transmit data from a distance between the
card and an RF machine reader, permitting Radio Frequency
Identification ("RFID").5 8 Such cards are already used in tollbooths,
of which E-ZPass is the most notable example. In addition,
contactless integrated circuits, consisting of an electronic chip and
antenna, can take the form of plastic sheets that are easily incorporated
into laminated passport covers or pages.5 9
The contactless integrated circuit in e-passports would rely on the
radio frequency machine reader for power, due to the impracticality of
incorporating battery power into the passports itself.60 Once a suitable
machine reader is in range, the reader would generate a strong radio
frequency electromagnetic field from its antenna, thus activating the
circuit.61 Using a "load modulation" process that varies the amount of
energy it draws from the electromagnetic field, the contactless
integrated circuit would then be able to transmit information to the
54 Id. at 7-8.
" Id. at9.
56 id.
571d.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6°Id. at 10.
61 Id. at 11.
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reader.62 The machine reader itself would consist of an antenna, a
control module, and a high frequency module for transmitting and
receiving.63 The ISO/IEC 14443 standard sets the RFID frequency at
13.56 MHz with a wavelength of 22.1m. 64 This standard limits the
maximum strength of the electromagnetic field and asserts a reliable
range of up to 10 cm between the circuit and reader.65 In addition,
radio frequency readers can read multiple contactless circuits
simultaneously, thereby increasing the speed and convenience of the
process.66  The suggested lifespan of an e-passport incorporating a
contactless integrated circuit is ten years, which represents the amount
of time the circuit can store its electrical charge.
67
D. DIGITAL SIGNATURES: USING PKI AND ACTIVE AUTHENTICATION
The U.S. Department of State has also followed ICAO standards
for information security by requiring digital signatures with a Public
Key Infrastructure ("PKI") scheme to be stored on the electronic
chip.68 PKI is used to protect the information contained in the
contactless circuit from tampering by confirming the authenticity and
integrity of the data and components. 69  Authenticity refers to
confirmation that the data structure and components were created by
the issuing authority; integrity refers to confirmation that the data
62 1d. at 10-13.
63 Id. at 11.
64Id. at 12.
651d. at 16.
66Id. at 10.
671d. at 17.
68 Proposed Rule, supra note 6, at 8,306.
69 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), TECHNICAL REPORT: PKI FOR MACHINE READABLE
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS OFFERING ICC READ-ONLY ACCESS: VERSION 1.1, 4, (Oct. 1, 2004),
available at http://www.icao.int/rnrtd/download/documents/TR-PKI%2omrtds%20iCC%
20read-onlyO/o20access%20v 1_1 .pdf [hereinafter PKI TECHNICAL REPORT].
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structure and components have not been altered from that created by
the issuing authority.70
The e-passport must prove possession of a private "key" in the
form of a series of numbers, before the radio frequency machine
reader recognizes the information contained within the chip as
authentic. 71  The reader first sends an 8-byte "challenge" to the
contactless circuit contained in the e-passport, which digitally "signs"
the value and returns it to the reader.72 The reader then verifies the
response by comparing it against the public "key" for that passport.73
This high strength digital signature prevents any copying of the digital
data and proves that the read data came from an authentic chip that has
not been substituted or amended.74 Each country using such active
authentication procedures generates its own public and private "keys,"
which will be distributed to other participating countries if those
countries sign certain certificates entrusting those countries with the
"keys. 75 Therefore, if personal or other information must be updated,
the e-passport would have to be replaced rather than amending the
existing information in the chip.76 If a bearer requests an updated e-
passport within one year of its original issuance, the replacement
would be provided free of charge.77
IV. OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE E-PASSPORT
PROPOSAL
After publishing its U.S. e-passport proposal in the Federal
Register on February 18, 2005, the Department of State designated a
70 LDS TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 12.
71 Ari Jules, David Molnar & David Wagner, Security and Privacy Issues in E-passports 9,
available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/095.pdf.
72 id.
73 Id.
74 PKI TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 18.
7 1Id. at 12-13.
76 Proposed Rule, supra note 6, at 8,306.
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forty-five day period for public comment until April 4, 2005.78 Within
that time period, the Department received a total of 2,335 comments:
98.5% were categorized as negative, 1% as positive, and 0.5% as
neutral, with the vast majority of negative comments citing security
and/or privacy concerns. 71 Outspoken privacy advocates have voiced
several concerns regarding the incorporation of biometric information
in e-passports, especially with the controversial use of RFID to
transmit data from a contactless integrated circuit to a machine reader.
A. UNAUTHORIZED CAPTURE OF INFORMATION
Concerns primarily deal with potential capture of the RFID
frequency and leakage of personal and biometric information.
Clandestine capture of the RFID frequency may occur in two ways:
"skimming" and "eavesdropping." "Skimming" refers to the
formation of an unauthorized connection with the contactless
integrated circuit to gain access to the information within.
80
"Eavesdropping" refers to the unauthorized interception of data
transmitted between a contactless integrated circuit and a radio
frequency machine reader.8'
1. LACK OF ENCRYPTION
Privacy advocates have expressed concern over the lack of
encryption for the information in the contactless chip, because of its
vulnerability to "skimming." 82 Although digital signature and public
78 Id. at 8,305.
79 Electronic Passport: Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,553, 61,553 (Oct. 25, 2005) (to be codified
at 22 CFR pt. 51), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/05-21284.htm [hereinafter
Final Rule].
'
0 Id. at 61,554.
81 Id.
82 Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) et al., Commentary, Comment in Response to U.S.
Department of State's Request for Comment Regarding the Issuance of E-Passports Using
RFID Technology 7 (Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/
RFID/RFID_passport.pdf [hereinafter EFF Comment].
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key infrastructure measures are in place to prevent amendment of or
tampering with data, the Department of State has chosen not to encrypt
the data. The Department has justified the lack of encryption for the
following reasons: (1) the data stored in the contactless electronic chip
is the same information displayed on the data page of the traditional
passport; (2) encryption would increase processing time at ports of
entry because encrypted data takes longer to read; and (3) encryption
may hinder ,lobal interoperability because of elevated technical
requirements. However, privacy advocates have disputed the merits
and truth of these arguments. 85
2. THE BROADCAST OF INFORMATION
RFID signals continuously transmit the data contained in the
contactless chip, and therefore without sufficient protection any
unauthorized radio frequency reader, possibly available on the open
market, may capture the signals.s6 Lee Tien, an attorney with the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, identified three aspects of RFID tags
that create privacy issues: (1) promiscuity, in that they will respond to
any compatible reader; (2) remote readings, in that RFID chips can
communicate at a distance and through certain materials; and (3)
stealth, in that these tags can appear inconspicuous as well as transmit
information without the bearer's knowledge. 87 The National Institute
of Standards and Technology has demonstrated that RFID signals with
digitally signed personal data can be captured by an antenna-equipped
reader from up to thirty feet away, much farther than the ICAO
specifications restricting the range to ten centimeters. 88  Thus, the
holder of an e-passport with insufficient protection may be continually
83 Proposed Rule, supra note 6, at 8,306.
84id.
85 EEF Comment, supra note 82, at 7.
86 Id. at 10.
87 Lee Tien, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), RFID Policy: What Does Congress Need to
Know?, available at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/RFID/RFID-onepager.pdf.
88 Junko Yoshida, Tests Reveal E-Passport Security Flaw, EE TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004,
http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=45400010.
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transmitting his personal information, national identity, and digitized
picture to anyone from thieves to terrorists.89
The Association of Corporate Travel Executives" and the
Business Travel Coalition91 have both released press statements on
March 28, 2005 condemning the Department of State's e-passport
proposal. Both organizations were particularly concerned about the
dangers of broadcasting personal information such as one's nationality
while traveling on business outside the United States, especially to
those interested in identifying and harming U.S. citizens.92
Furthermore, inclusion of personal information such as the e-passport
holder's name, date of birth, and a digitized photograph in the
contactless integrated circuit would increase the risk of identity theft if
unauthorized parties captured such information.93
3. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Some experts recommend the enclosure of e-passports with
"Faraday cages," named after the scientist Michael Faraday, who
found that an electrical charge given within a hollow conductor will
spread over the outside of the conductor, producing no electrical field
inside the conductor.94 The "Faraday cage" is made of material that
will prevent dispersion of the RFID signal.95 However, even if such
"Faraday cages" are utilized, the RFID signals are still susceptible to
unauthorized "eavesdropping" when the "Faraday cage" is removed or
89 Id.
90 Press Release, Jack Riepe, ACTE Global Communications Director, ACTE Says Passport
"Bugs" Could Put U.S. Travelers At Risk (Mar. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.acte.org/resources/press-release.php?id=56.
91 Press Release, Kevin Mitchell, U.S. State Department Proposed Passport Program Is Bad
Policy (Mar. 28, 2005), available at http://btcweb.biz/rfidstatement.htm.
92 Id.; Riepe, supra note 90.
93 Jules, Molnar & Wagner, supra note 71, at 5.
94 RF Safe, Faraday Cage, http://www.rfsafe.com/research/rfradiation/shielding_ rfhazards/
faradaycage.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
95 Jules, Molnar & Wagner, supra note 71, at 2.
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the e-passport is opened during inspection.96 Privacy advocate Bill
Scannell, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, amongst others, have advocated that
unauthorized capture of RFID information and the associated risks
could be eliminated by simply switching to contact integrated circuits
(requiring physical contact with the machine reader).97 Not only does
such a switch eliminate the "skimming" and "eavesdropping" issues,
but consumers are already accustomed to and are aware of the risks of
such technology, due to the widespread use of credit cards and other
swipeable contact cards.98  Other options that avoid implementing
RFID include "2-D barcodes," readable at a distance, and optical
memory stripe cards, which require presenting the card to the reader at
a certain distance and orientation." Furthermore, these alternatives
avoid the need for encryption. Renowned security technologist Bruce
Schneier speculates that the only reason for choosing the riskier
contactless chip is that the U.S. government is actively seeking the
ability to stealthily capture the information continually broadcasted for
itself, to identify certain individuals or groups of people.' 00
B. CLANDESTINE TRACKING
As long as the information within a contactless integrated chip is
freely broadcasted, anyone who can access the information with an
unauthorized radio frequency reader could clandestinely track an
individual. 1 1 Every RFID tag contains a unique identifying number
that distinguishes one e-passport holder from another carrying a
96 id.
97 EFF Comment, supra note 82, at 6.
98 Id.
99 Id.
1oo Bruce Schneier, Does Big Brother Want to Watch?: Passport Radio Chips Send Too Many
Signals, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.iht.com/artickes/2004/10/04/edschneiered3_.php.
101 EFF Comment, supra note 82.
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different RFID tag.102 Tracking would therefore allow unauthorized
users to monitor and record a specific individual's actions.
10 3
RFID technology has garnered much press recently for its
application in the retail industry by large companies such as Wal-Mart
and Walgreens. Walgreens has begun incorporating RFID tags in
promotional store displays to analyze the impact of the displays and
their locations on sales.' 4 Seventy protestors filled the sidewalks next
to a Dallas Wal-Mart to protest the store's use of RFID to tag
individual consumer items, 0 5  such as the Hewlett-Packard
printer/scanners. 10 6  Privacy advocates such as Katherine Albrecht,
founder of Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and
Numbering ("CASPIAN"), have raised concerns about the tracking of
consumer products, from which tracking of purchasers' behavior
results without their knowledge. 10 7  Albrecht advocates the use of
RFID tags to track the transportation of merchandise, but only if the
tags are destroyed once the products reach the ultimate consumers. 1
08
C. FUNCTION CREEP
Clandestine tracking could lead to "function creep," in which the
use of obtained information is expanded to include purposes beyond
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Press Release, GOLIATH Solutions, GOLIATH Solutions to Install Display Tracking
System at Walgreens Stores Chainwide (Dec. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.forbes.com/prnewswire/feeds/prnewswire/2005/12/05/prnewswire200512050901P
RNEWSBMWTCGCGM022.html.
105 CASPIAN Anti-RFID Protest: Dallas, Texas, http://www.spychips.com/protest/walmart/
protest-slideshow/index.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
106 Laurie Sullivan, Consumer Group Calls for RFID Protest at Dallas Wal-Mart,
INFORMATIONWEEK Oct. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtmljsessionid=0CHHDQNIXBLSWQSND
BECKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleID=1 72301047.
107 See id.
10' Todd R. Weiss, Privacy Groups Question RFID Use in Medicine Tracking,
COMPUTERWORLD Oct. 14, 2005, available at http://www.computerworld.com/
securitytopics/security/privacy/story/O, 10801,105432,00.html.
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those initially stated. 0 9 Privacy concerns are raised when such
"function creep" occurs without the knowledge or consent of the
individual providing the information. 0 The classic example is the
expanded use of Social Security numbers, which are now incorporated
as a form of identification in secondary, non-governmental uses.I' Of
primary concern is how the personal and biometric information
contained in the e-passports will be shared among other agencies and
databases. 112
A "function creep" of clandestine tracking could include
"hotlisting" or "profiling," which refers to the assembly of a database
matching unique identifiers to specific individuals. 113 Such a database
containing personal information could affect individuals' anonymity,
as use of standard biometrics could allow tracked information such as
business transactions, habits, or ethnicity to be linked together. 14 The
risk of abuse regarding such a database is high, as assemblers of such a
database could compile a profile of an individual's actions and private
life.115 The risk of such abuse is compounded by the inclusion of
biometric information in contactless integrated circuits, as biometric
identification technology could lead to surveillance and acquisition of
109 Paul Rosenzweig, Alane Kochems & Ari Schwartz, Biometric Technologies: Security,
Legal, and Policy Implications, THE HERITAGE FOUND., June 21, 2004,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefenselm12.cfm.
110Id.
1"1 Malcolm Crompton, Fed. Privacy Comm'r, Biometrics and Privacy: The End of the World
as We Know It or The White Knight of Privacy? (Mar. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/speeches/sp80notes.htm.
112 Jane Wakefield, Doubts Over Biometric Passports, BBC NEWS, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl1/hi/technology/4381160.stm.
113 American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, RFID: Government Identification
Documents and "Tracking'" Issues 6, 8 (Dec. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.aclunc.org/privacy/technology/yes768/050808-rfid-packet.pdf.
114 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT 05-551 25-26 (May 27, 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05551 .pdf#search=%22Govemment%20Accountability/o20
Office%2C%2ORadio%2OFrequency/o2OIdentification%2OTechnology%2Oin%20the%2OFed
eral%20Government%22.
115Id.
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personal data without the individual's awareness or consent.
16
Biometric information can act as a unique identifier to bring together
unrelated pieces of information about an individual, thus eliminating
that individual's control over the use of his or her information. 117
In comments to the Department of Homeland Security, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center expressed concern about
biometric data collected for the US-VISIT program, citing the
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System ("CAPPS I") as
an instance where "mission creep," (also known as "function creep")
became problematic." 8  Intended originally as an aviation security
tool, the use of CAPPS II has expanded into the law enforcement
realm, particularly in analysis of those with outstanding arrest
warrants 
9
D. THE DANGERS OF INFORMATION CONCENTRATION
The decision to include a digitalized photograph on the e-
passport's chip may lead to the incorporation of those photographs
into a database. This could allow facial recognition systems to survey
and compile a list of individuals' actions and travels. Moreover, this
"function creep" may consequently lead to the integration and inter-
agency sharing of such personal information. Barry Kefauver, who
heads the ICAO's biometric working group in the creation of global
standards, noted that although linkage of data between e-passports and
law enforcement databases is controversial and would require
safeguards it is essential for realizing the e-passport's enhanced
security. 12d Kefauver claims that preventing the proliferation of false
passports by comparing passports to a list of lost or stolen documents
116 Id.
..7 Crompton, supra note 111.
118 Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Comments in Response to Department of
Homeland Security Border and Transportation Security Doctorate, Docket No. BTS 03-01:
Interim Final Rule and Notice, 5-6, http://www.epic.org/privacy/us-visit/us-
visitcomments.pdf.
119 Id at6.
120 Wakefield, supra note 112.
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is crucial because a "fake passport in the hands of a terrorist is as
important a tool as a bomb."' 1
Frank E. Moss, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services
of the Department of State, also recognizes the importance of ensuring
that only entitled American citizens receive U.S. passports and
therefore finds international data exchange essential. The
Department of State has worked on establishing data-sharing programs
with other federal agencies such as the Social Security Administration
("SSA") (to verify identities by correlating applicant data with the
information in the SSA systems) and the U.S. Marshals Service (to
accumulate names of fugitives or other individuals of concern to law
enforcement in a passport "lookout system"). 123 The Department of
State has also worked to implement international programs, such as
INTERPOL, with which the Department shares its lost and stolen
passport database. 124  The Department of Homeland Security is
currently working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI') to
make the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System ("IAFIS")125 more interoperable with the Department of
Homeland Security's Automated Biometric Identification System
("IDENT") in an effort to identify those with outstanding criminal
warrants. lz6 The linkage of multiple databases containing personal
information or its concentration in a central database increases the
potential for tracking individuals and their activities for secondary
uses of the information without consent.
127
121 Id.
122 Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detention Efforts: Hearing on
GAO Report 05-477 Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 109th Cong.
(June 29, 2005) (statement of Frank E. Moss, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Passport Services,
U.S. Dep't of State), available at
http://travel.state.gov/law/legal/testimony/testimony_2552.html.
123 id.
124 id.
125 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division,
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System or IAFIS,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
126 Interview with Williams & Hyatt, supra note 15.
127 Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 328 (2002).
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E. ASSOCIATION OF BIOMETRICS WITH CRIMINALITY
Privacy advocates are also concerned about the association of
biometric identification information with criminality, 28 particularly,
the inclusion of fingerprint information in e-passport contactless
integrated circuits. 129 The ICAO has made optional the inclusion of
digitized fingerprint information as an encoded identification
feature, 130 though the European Union ("EU") has mandated that both
facial and fingerprint information be included in the e-passports for the
fifteen member states which have adopted the Schengen Treaty (which
removed EU internal border controls). 131  Germany has mandated
incorporation of fingerprints be incorporated into its e-passports by
March 2007.132 Fingerprints have been traditionally used to identify
criminals, using a one-to-many search in which an individual's
fingerprint is compared to all those listed in a database; such an
association with the criminal justice system is thought to render people
reluctant to get fingerprinted.
F. THE DANGERS OF AUTOMATION
Automation of e-passport deployment and authentication could
lead to less human oversight, thereby increasing the risk of biometric
authentication system deception. 34 Radio frequency machine readers
121 Id. at 364-65.
1291 Id. at 364.
130 LDS TECHNCAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 22.
131 Mark Oliver & Agencies, Cost of Standard UK Passport to Rise, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1644867,00.html.
132 Victor Homola, World Briefing Europe: Germany: Debut for Electronic Passports, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at AS, available at http://query.nytimes.con/gst/
fullpage.htrl?res=9EOCE5DA1 63EF93 IA35752C 1A9639C8B63&fta=y.
133 Rich Lowry, The Power of the Fingerprint, JEWISH WORLD REV., June 27, 2005,
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0605/lowry062405.php3; see also findBiometrics.com,
Privacy- Friend or Foe?, http://www.findbiometrics.com/Pages/privacy.htmi.
134 EFF Comment, supra note 82, at 13.
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can read multiple e-passport contactless integrated circuits at a time
because of their anti-collision technology, and therefore prevent
potential interference from two different e-passports in the same
range. 1
3 5
Tsutomu Matsumoto, a cryptographer, has demonstrated that
plastic mold made out of gelatin can be used to imitate a fingerprint;
the fake finger fooled fingerprint detectors eighty percent of the
time. 36 Matsumoto enhanced fingerprints taken from a glass with
super-glue fumes, photographed them with a digital camera, and after
some work with PhotoShop, he printed the fingerprint onto a
transparency sheet.137 Then, he etched the fingerprint onto a copper
printed-circuit board using the transparency and made a gelatinous
finger from the etchings.'J Thus, the risk of deceiving the system
appears real in light of the relative technical ease involved in the
process. Increased automation of e-passport authentication and
inspection could also increase the risk of such biometric imitations to
bypass biometric authentication systems.
V. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S REVISED APPROACH
On October 25, 2005, the Department of State released its final
rule regarding the design and implementation of U.S. e-passports. In
response to the many negative comments received during the
rulemaking process regarding security and privacy issues, the
Department of State has worked with the Government Printing Office
and National Institute of Standards and Technology to add security
enhancements designed to address the major privacy concerns
regarding its previous proposal, in accordance with ICAO
recommendations. 1
3 9
135 USE OF CONTACTLESS ICs, supra note 51, at 10.
136 John Leyden, Gummi Bears Defeat Fingerprint Sensors, THE REGISTER, May 16, 2002,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/16/gummibearsdefeatfingerprint-sensors/.
137 Id.
138 id.
139 Final Rule, supra note 79, at 61,553-61,554; see supra Part III (A)-(D) of this article.
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A. RETAINING RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION
Despite the numerous privacy concerns with Radio Frequency
Identification ("RFID)" the Department of State has elected to
preserve its use of contactless integrated circuits embedded in the
cover of the e-passport.14 0 In order to protect against hacking and
counterfeiting of the RFID signal, the Department of State is utilizing
third party certification, and conducting regular audits of chip
manufacturers and processes to ensure security.' 4 1 In addition, the
contactless chip will be placed in a newly designed, tamper-proof
document in the e-passport. 142 The Department of State rejected the
concept of replacing the contactless chip with a contact chip because
contact chip technology does not transfer well from card formats to
book-type formats. 143 Because contact chips require physical contact
with the reader, instituting contact chips in a book-format passport
would lead to unreliable readings; this unreliability is expanded by the
increased wear from repeated insertion of the e-passport into machine
readers. 144
B. ANTI-SKIMMING COVER
Working in combination with the Government Printing Office to
test devices that reduce the passport's vulnerability to "skimming," the
Department of State has revised the U.S. e-passport cover and spine to
include anti-skimming materials preventing RFD signals from
escaping.145 Although this cover will not prevent "eavesdropping" on
authorized readings, it is an effective way to prevent unauthorized
readings when the e-passport holder does not expect it.146 The results
14Id. at 61,553.
141 Id. at 61,554.
14 2 id.
143 Id.
1441id
"
146 Jules, Molnar & Wagner, supra note 71, at 11.
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of tests conducted by the Department of State, in conjunction with the
Government Printing Office and National Institute of Standards and
Technology, indicate that the addition of the anti-skimming material
will alleviate the threat of "skimming" beyond the ICAO standard of
ten centimeters while the e-passport is closed or partially closed. 1
47
C. BASIC ACCESS CONTROL
In response to calls for the encryption of e-passport data, the
Department of State will also incorporate Basic Access Control
("BAC"), which requires authentication of radio frequency readers
before data transmission, and the encryption of the data transfer
between the contactless integrated circuit and the machine reader.
148
BAC requires a machine reader to physically identify the Personal
Identification Number ("PIN" in order to unlock the data on the
contactless integrated circuit. 149 Without accessing a PIN, no reader
could retrieve the e-passport data via RFID signal access. The PIN for
U.S. e-passports is accessible by physically scanning the second line
of printed characters on the Machine-Readable Zone on the e-passport
data page. 150 The data page is the page of the passport with a facial
portrait and personal information, and two printed lines at the bottom
representing the Machine-Readable Zone. 51 The passport officer
would optically scan the readable portion using the reader, which
would generate the PIN from the scanned data, thus allowing the
reader to capture the RFID signal. 152 Officials from the Department of
State admitted that it previously underestimated the potential range of
RFID signal transmissions.1
5 3
147 Final Rule, supra note 79, at 61,554.
148 id.
149 id.
150 Id.
151 LDS TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 10-11.
152 Kim Zetter, Feds Rethinking RFID Passport, WIRED NEWS, April 26, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,l 848,67333,00.html.
153 id.
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The incorporation of the BAC process complies with ICAO
Document 9303 security recommendations, 54 and will prevent
"skimming" and "eavesdropping" even if the e-passport is open. One
cannot "skim" because BAC requires physically opening and scanning
the e-passport through the reader before accessing the contactless chip
data; one cannot eavesdrop because the communication channel
between the integrated circuit and the machine reader remains
encrypted, as BAC requires the correct PIN number. 5 5 Some vendors
testing e-passports that incorporate BAC have found that read times
are twice as slow as those without it; however, these differences in
read times represented a matter of seconds.'
56
In addition, the Department of State believes that physically
shielding the radio frequency machine readers will also minimize the
possibility of "eavesdropping" while the e-passport is open at the
inspection site.'
57
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the September 11, 2001, tragedy, the United States
government has focused on increasing the nation's border security,
particularly through the incorporation of biometric technology into
security procedures. In addition to its use in the US-VISIT program,
the use of biometric information has garnered much international
attention due to the U.S. Visa Waiver requirements calling for
biometric information in e-passports. These requirements, based on
ICAO standards, have sent other nations scrambling to manufacture
and implement acceptable electronic passports that store biometric
information such as digital photographs in electronic chips within the
passports.
154 PKI TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 15-17 (recommending the inclusion of optional
security features such as active authentication, basic access control, extended access control,
and encryption).
155 Zetter, supra note 152.
156 LIN YIH & SUNNY Ho, SUMMARY REPORT OF E-MRTD INTERFEST TESTING SESSION 4 3
(2005), available at http://www.itsc.org.sg/tc/
6thtermcompo/SummaryoflnterFest3Feb05_Final.pdf.
157 Final Rule, supra note 79, at 61,554.
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Contactless reading of such biometric information using a RFID
signal capture process has raised a significant number of privacy
concerns, most notably regarding the unauthorized capture of personal
information, the potential for clandestine tracking, hotlisting, and
function creep, and to a lesser extent, the association of such
information with criminality and the danger of automation.
Taking these concerns into account, the Department of State has
revised its e-passport approach to provide additional protection for
personal information. Although the use of RFID to transfer the
information has been retained and concerns regarding clandestine
tracking and information concentration remain unanswered, the
introduction of an anti-skimming front-cover and BAC will serve to
prevent the unauthorized capture and use of biometric information.
The Department of Homeland Security successfully completed its
testing of e-passports and readers that apply BAC at the San Francisco
International Airport in April 2006.158 The Department of Homeland
Security had been testing e-passport machine readers, in conjunction
with the nations of Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore to ensure
global interoperability and international implementation of ICAO
standards. 159 A spokesman for the Department of State has announced
that it will begin issuing electronic passports on August 14, 2006, at
the Denver Passport Agency, followed by the Special Issuance Agency
in Washington D.C.16
0
158 Roy Mark, U.S. Completes E-Passport Testing, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Apr. 20, 2006,
http://www.intemetnews.com/infra/article.php/3600526.
159 Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Security, E-Passport Testing to Begin at San Francisco
InternationalAirport (Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content--5342.
160 Security Document World, U.S. Epassport Ready to Roll, Aug. 4,2006,
http://www.securitydocumentworld.com/public/index.cfin?&ml=c_10&m2=c_4&m3=e_0&
m4=e_0&subIteID=682.
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